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1 Introduction
Modern legislative politics in the U.S. is characterized by two important features. First,
the number of active interest groups has dramatically increased over the last four decades,
from 5000 in 1955 to over 33000 at the end of the twentieth century. Political scientists
like Huntington (1975), Salisbury (1990) and Wilson (1979) viewed this proliferation of
interests as an indication of a more fragmented and atomistic political system. Second,
coalitions of interest groups abound.1 For instance, by conducting a survey on data of the
Congressional Information Services Index and interviews, Hula (1999) showed that respec-
tively 81.3, 79.6 and 83.3 percent of interviewed institutional members agree on thinking
that forming coalitions is the best way to be e¤ective in politics in areas like transporta-
tion, education and civil rights issues. The eld of transportation, for instance, features
heavy lobbying by business interests gathered in strong coalitions, primarily trade associ-
ations such as the American Bus Association or the Air Transport Association defending
long-term economic interests on regulation and deregulation of transport industries. In
the case of education, although business interests play a much lesser role, two- and four-
year colleges as well as universities and the Big Sixorganizations are associations acting
as major lobbyists in the reforms of the education system.
The choice by interest groups to compete ercely or to adopt collusive behaviors in
legislative politics certainly reects the huge diversity in their objectives, audiences and in
the related economic issues at stake. The macro-organization of interest groups may also
be related to the structure of the transaction costs which shape interactions in the political
arena when informational asymmetries prevail. In spite of the fact that understanding
this organization is of paramount importance to explain the design of economic policies,
still, very little is known about the interest groups incentives either to compete head-
to-head or to form an active coalition. Although this organizational issue has attracted
much attention in political science,2 it is still being ignored, by and large, in the political
economy literature.
To address these issues, we start from the well-admitted view that interest groups
play an important informational role in legislative politics.3 To inuence policy decision-
1An example is given by the Committee for Education Funding which is the best-known coalition in
education policy. It involves more than one hundred organizations looking for higher levels of funding.
Hula (1999) reported that By organizing and speaking with a common voice, the Committee for Education
Funding can dene the public debate in terms of overall funding on education while simultaneously making
a case for each members specic programs, in e¤ect collectivizing the benets and the risks.
2For instance, Hula (1999) argued that the macroeconomic view of the interest groups community
often overlooks a number of institutional links between interest groups, most notably the increasing use of
long-term, recurrent, and institutionalized coalitions in many policy arenas.
3See Milbrath (1963), Wright (1990), Hansen (1991), Krehbiel (1992) and more recently, Grossman
and Helpman (2001).
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making, lobbyists spend time and resources conveying information to uninformed political
decision-makers. Because their preferences may conict with those of the policy-makers,
interest groups manipulate information to promote their own interests. Public policies
result from a trade-o¤between the benets that the legislature nds when communicating
with the privately informed interest groups to make policies more exible, and the cost
of departing from its own preferences to induce information revelation. Informational
asymmetries create signicant transaction costs and public policies result from a rules
versus discretiontrade-o¤. Rules may better reect the legislatures preferences but are
chosen without any information held by private interests. More exible policies are fea-
sible provided that society chooses policies which are better aligned with those preferred
by private interests. Rules are certainly more valuable when the interest groupsprefer-
ences and those of society diverge whereas, otherwise, more exible policies become more
attractive.
The study of this trade-o¤ is key not only to better understand the relationships of in-
formed interest groups with the legislature, but also how interest groups interact with each
other. Transaction costs minimization provides some rationale for the macro-organization
of interest groups: Whether interest groups stay apart or adopt more collusive behaviors
certainly reects their private incentives towards such cost minimization and how vari-
ous organizational forms of lobbying a¤ect the congruence of private and social interests.
This paper analyzes the consequences of interest groups adopting various kinds of be-
haviors from competitive to more collusive ones taking the perspectives of societys and
interest groupswelfare. We also investigate how optimal policies respond to the lack of
congruence between private and social interests induced by those behaviors.
Our basic insight can be summarized as follows. By remaining split apart and compet-
ing, interest groups make it possible that their own preferences end up being represented
in the implemented policy with some probability: a screening e¤ect. By the same token
however, the cost of competition for a given group is that optimal policies may reect
with some probability the preferences of a competing group. On the other hand, by merg-
ing and credibly sharing information within a strong coalition, interest groups may better
represent their joint interest although individual preferences are no longer represented: an
informativeness e¤ect. The best organizational form of lobbying depends on the degree of
congruence between the groups and the legislature induced by those organizations. With
high congruence, exible policies become more attractive. Strong coalitions are favored
both from a private and a social viewpoint. Instead, greater conicts between private and
social interests call for more rigid rules which can be somewhat relaxed by having groups
compete. Indeed, favoring one group in the policy choice eases information revelation
on the latters preferences although, at the same time, it makes impossible to reect the
preferences of competing groups. Competition implements more exible policies although
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these policies are biased towards one particular group at the time.
Key to the success of a coalition is its ability to credibly share information. Weak
coalitions that fail to do so are never optimal. Because of its internal informational
problem, a weak coalition pretends having a lowest joint interest for the policy at stake
as compared to its strong counterpart. This makes a weak coalition less congruent with
the rest of society and calls for rigid polices.
Our model predicts an increase in the number of active interest groups when conicts
of interests on political issues are exacerbated. More collusive behaviors are expected for
minor conicts of interests with the rest of society. In this case, since only the strong
coalitions should emerge, coalitions should look for e¢ cient means to credibly share in-
formation.4
Our paper departs signicantly from the existing literature on the informational role
of interest groups in terms of modelling tools and in scope of analysis. Starting with
the seminal contributions by Crawford and Sobel (1982), Austen-Smith (1990) and Kre-
hbiel (1992), lobbying groups are generally viewed as informed Stackelberg leaders in
the communication game played with an uninformed policy-maker.5 Although a priori
attractive, this approach nevertheless faces some di¢ culties to reach normative implica-
tions on the overall organization of lobbying. Signalling games are generally plagued with
a multiplicity of ine¢ cient partition equilibria and, in the absence of any convincing equi-
librium renement, the comparison of alternative organizational forms is only indicative
of the forces shaping the overall organization of lobbying groups. The mechanism design
perspective adopted in this paper does not su¤er from this weakness.6 We reverse the
timing of standard lobbying games and assume that the policy-maker commits ex-ante to
a mechanism which stipulates how policies respond to the lobbyistsprivate information.
For a given organizational form of lobbying, the Revelation Principle fully characterizes
the set of feasible incentive allocations. The normative comparison between the optimal
mechanisms obtained under various arrangements is then meaningful.
This mechanism design approach was initiated by Melumad and Shibano (1991) in
the context of a single informed agent who cannot inuence the decision-maker through
transfers.7 It was pursued by Baron (2000) in a model studying the organization of the
legislature. Legislators in a given committee have similar preferences (driven by the same
common shock) but now monetary resources can be exchanged between the uninformed
oor and an informed committee. Monetary transfers obviously help to satisfy incentive
4Trade associations in the eld of transportation policy are typical examples in order.
5Klevorick et al. (1984) compared information gathering with majority voting without considering
the incentive problem.
6La¤ont (2000) o¤ered a more general defense of this perspective to explain constitutional choices.
7See also Holmström (1984), Green and Stokey (1981) and Armstrong (1994).
4
compatibility constraints. We depart from this set of assumptions by focusing on the
case where there are no such monetary transfers (except within a coalition), thereby
stressing only the informational role of interest groups.8 Also, in our model, interest
groups have di¤erent pieces of private information. Finally, the issue of nding the optimal
organization of lobbying is not analyzed by Baron (2000).9 In particular, our focus on the
di¤erent forms of collusive behavior that interest groups may adopt is novel.
Although the mechanism design approach can be viewed as an alternative to the sig-
nalling literature, that literature has nevertheless delivered some insights on organizational
issues by comparing equilibria outcomes. Austen-Smith (1993a, 1993b) analyzed com-
munication patterns when interest groups report either sequentially or simultaneously.10
Krishna and Morgan (2000) studied a lobbying game with two informed lobbyists who
share the same information on the state of nature but may have conicting or congruent
views on what should be the optimal policy. They showed that conicting views help the
policy-maker to extract information. A mechanism design approach predicts in such a
context the existence of a costless, fully communicative equilibrium irrespective of bias.11
This extreme result leads us to focus on the case where interest groups have idiosyn-
cratic private information on their ideal points.12 Finally, Battaglini and Benabou (2003)
developed a signalling model with multiple interest groups entering into costly lobbying
activities. They also argue that low conict of interests may favor coalitional behavior
just as we will do below.13
At a broader theoretical level, our analysis of interest groups coalition formation also
contributes to the literature on collusion under asymmetric information pioneered by
La¤ont and Martimort (1997, 2000). However, contrary to this literature which was de-
8The informational role of interest groups results in a trade-o¤ between control and communication.
Recently, Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006) considered a similar tradeo¤ in a rather di¤erent
context.
9Baron and Meirowitz (2001) draw also some links between the signalling and the mechanism design
approaches. They argued that with a convenient choice of out-of equilibrium beliefs capturing the lack of
commitment assumption of the signalling game, the two approaches are equivalent. On the relationship
between models with or without commitment, see also Mylovanov (2004) who showed that any incentive
compatible mechanism without transfers can be implemented with very little commitment using a veto-
based delegation. Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) also considered the problem of designing a mechanism
without transfers to achieve a given target when agents are driven by di¤erent motives.
10Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) showed that the order of speech can improve information revelation.
11This would be obtained by using a revelation mechanism à la Maskin (1999).
12Grossman and Helpman (2001, Chapter 4) also compared the informativeness of various equilibria
depending on whether the lobbyistsmessages on their private information are public or private.
13Although some of their results look similar to ours, the two models are hardly comparable because,
on top of a major di¤erence in timing coming from their analyzing a signalling model, several ingredients
which are key to equilibrium characterization di¤er. In their paper, interest groups have discrete signals
on a binary state of the world in a common values environment whereas we focus on a private values
setting with a continuum of signals; lobbying is costly in their paper and costless here; and the public
decision is of a zero-one nature in their model whereas it responds smoothly to communicated information
in ours.
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veloped in a framework where monetary transfers between the principals and the colluding
agents are feasible, the analysis of weak and strong coalitions developed in this paper takes
place in a framework where transfers cannot be used by the principal.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the optimal continuous mechanism
when interest groups compete.14 Section 4 motivates our modelling assumptions for the
game of coalition formation between interest groups. Section 5 analyzes the case of a
strong coalition where two groups credibly share information and collectively inuence a
policy-maker to promote their joint interests. Finally, Section 6 does the same for a weak
coalition where interest groups share information by means of an incentive compatible
side-mechanism. Section 7 compares the organizational forms of lobbying using either a
social or a private perspective. Section 8 proposes alleys for further research. Proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Preferences and Information: We consider a legislature (the principal) that is inu-
enced by two interest groups (the agents, indexed by i = 1; 2) in an otherwise standard
model of informational lobbying. The sole means of inuence available to the agents is
the communication of their private information. The principal aggregates information
privately held by those interest groups and chooses a one-dimensional policy q on behalf
of the society. Depending on the application, this policy can be a tax, an import tari¤,
a regulated price, or a number of allowed permits. The agents and the principal have all
single-peaked quadratic preferences dened over the policy q respectively as follows:
Ui(q; i) =  1
2
(q   i)2; for i = 1; 2 and V (q; 1; 2) =  1
2

q   1
2
(1 + 2)  
2
:
The legislature not only aggregates the preferences of active interest groups but also takes
into account those of the rest of society. We capture this e¤ect by assuming that the prin-
cipal has a bias  > 0 with respect to the benchmark policy which is derived by averaging
the interest groupsideal points. Without any such bias, and if completely informed on the
groupspreferences, the principal would choose an e¢ cient decision averaging the groups
ideal points with an equal weight for each. More generally, the principal can be viewed as
a social welfare maximizer taking into account in his objective the well-being of the rest
of society. That the legislature also values the interests of the general public although it
is not organized as an active lobby is also justied when policy-makers have reelection
14The restriction to continuous mechanisms is important to get a simple characterization of optimal
mechanisms which is more amenable to comparisons between di¤erent organizational forms.
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concerns and want to please voters who do not belong to any organized groups.15
Interest group i has private information on his ideal point i. The preference parame-
ters 1 and 2 are drawn identically, independently and uniformly on  = [0; 1] according
to the cumulative distribution F () = . E() denotes the expectation operator.
To give the best opportunity to collusive behavior and still introduce some heterogene-
ity between groups, we assume that although both agents have the same expected conict
with the principal ex-ante, their ideal points may di¤er ex-post. On average both groups
tend to prefer a lower policy than the principal. This is common knowledge although the
precise extent by which they prefer so is their private information.16
Grand-Mechanisms: The principal commits himself to a mechanism stipulating which
policy should be implemented as a function of the interest groupsreports on their own
preferences. For a given postulated behavior of the interest groups (either competition
or collusion), the Revelation Principle states that there is indeed no loss of generality in
restricting the principal to o¤er direct and truthful revelation grand-mechanisms. With
such mechanisms, the principal commits to a (possibly random) rule stipulating which
policy to follow in response to the groupsreports on their preferences. Following Melumad
and Shibano (1991), we focus on deterministic mechanisms of the form fq(^1; ^2)g(^1;^2)22
where ^i is group is report on his ideal point.17
The commitment assumption is attractive from a normative viewpoint because it solves
the equilibrium indeterminacy that arises in the signalling environment where the interest
groups would move rst. The mechanism design approach fully characterizes the set of
incentive feasible allocations achievable at any equilibrium of a communication game.
This property is quite attractive as far as one is concerned with the normative comparison
between various organizational forms of lobbying.18
15Grossman and Helpman (2001) developed a signalling model with two interest groups who have
private information on the same preference parameter. They argued that similar analysis should be
performed in the case of idiosyncratic private information. They suggested analyzing a legislature with
the same objective function than here but did not perform any formal analysis.
16We could account for di¤erences in the directions in which interest groups want the policy to be
pushed by having preferences being drawn from di¤erent supports or by having asymmetric biases. This
would be at the cost of an increase in the technicalities without much new insights on the incentives to
collude or not. We could also easily address the case where interest groups prefer on average a higher
policy than the principals average ideal point (i.e.,  < 0). The corresponding results and intuitions can
be easily obtained by permuting the direction of most e¤ects with respect to the present paper.
17It is not known whether random mechanisms could help in our context with a continuum of types.
Moreover, stochastic mechanisms are harder to enforce than deterministic ones; they require that the
randomizing device used to determine allocations be publicly veriable to be not manipulable by the
principal himself if he was nding worth to do so. We leave the analysis of stochastic mechanisms which
is slightly orthogonal to our main purposes for further research.
18The commitment assumption prevails in the political economy literature on inuence (see for instance
the common agency models of Grossman and Helpman, 2001) as well as in the axiomatic theory of
bargaining with a politician (Tauman and Zapechelnyuk, 2006).
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Timing: The game unfolds as follows. First, an organizational form of lobbying is chosen
with interest groups either competing or colluding.19 Second, each group observes only
his own preferences. Third, the principal o¤ers a grand-mechanism fq(^1; ^2)g(^1;^2)22 .
Fourth, if a coalition has been formed, member interest groups agree on some collusive way
of transmitting information to the decision-maker. This will be more explicitly explained
in Section 4. Fifth, interest groups report their preferences. Finally, the corresponding
policy is implemented by the principal.
Benchmark: Suppose that the legislature remains uninformed on the interest groups
preferences and commits ex-ante to a policy. The principal then chooses a rigid policy
qp which maximizes his expected payo¤ E(1;2)
n
 1
2
 
q   1
2
(1 + 2)  
2o
. One easily
nds:
qp =
1
2
+ :
This is the expected value of the interest groupsideal points augmented by the social
bias . Of course, this policy might be improved by using an e¤ective communication
mechanism between the legislature and the interest groups.
3 Competing Interest Groups
To model competition between interest groups, we rely on dominant strategy implementa-
tion. The motivation for doing so is three-fold. First, we follow most of the social choice
literature20 to characterize incentive mechanisms in a context where agents do not re-
spond to monetary incentives. Although Bayesian implementation would obviously relax
incentive constraints, dominant strategy implementation is amenable to a straightforward
comparison between competition and collusion. Another (and quite standard) motivation
for using dominant strategy implementation is that this concept is not sensitive to the be-
liefs that interest groups have on each others preferences.21 Finally, focusing on dominant
strategy implementation is su¢ cient to obtain the main result that competition between
interest groups may sometimes improve the principals expected payo¤ compared to the
outcome achieved with a coalition. A fortiori, this would also be the case had Bayesian
implementation been used.
With dominant strategy, the incentive compatibility constraints for interest group i
can be written as:
i = argmin
^i
(q(^i;  i)  i)2; i = 1; 2;8i 2 : (1)
19We do not analyze the game of coalition formation at that stage. We will simply compare the expected
payo¤s of both the legislature and the interest groups under various organizational forms.
20See Moulin (1980) and the survey by Sprumont (1995) among others.
21Bergemann and Morris (2005).
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Using (1), standard revealed preference arguments show that q() is monotonically in-
creasing in each of its arguments and thus almost everywhere di¤erentiable in (1; 2).22
At any point of di¤erentiability, incentive constraints can be written as:
@q
@i
(i;  i)(q(i;  i)  i) = 0; i = 1; 2; 8(i;  i) 2 2: (2)
Hence, q() is either locally constant in a neighborhood of i or equal to the ideal point of
group i and thus independent on  i. On the neighborhood where q() is locally constant,
the policy is rigid and does not make use of interest group is report on his type. Com-
munication has a more e¤ective role when q() is not locally constant. The implemented
policy is then type- and group-dependent. This leads to the following characterization of
dominant strategy continuous schemes.
Lemma 1 : For any symmetric dominant strategy and continuous mechanism q(), there
exist cut-o¤s ,  and  with      such that:
q(1; 2) = minf;maxf1; g;maxf2; g;maxf1; 2; gg: (3)
These dominant strategy mechanisms can be given an interesting interpretation. For the
region where a state dependent decision is implemented, the ideal point of one of the
interest groups is chosen. The outcome occurs as though the interest group had residual
control rights on the decision and would choose the policy on behalf of the rest of society.
The continuous mechanisms in (3) have already been described in Moulin (1980).
However, his characterization was obtained by imposing dominant strategy on a larger
domain including all single-peaked preferences. Our restriction to quadratic preferences
could a priori leave the possibility that other continuous mechanisms might be feasible
but Lemma 1 shows that this is actually not the case. Finally, the focus on continuous
mechanisms allows us to maintain a tractable analysis and will facilitate comparisons
between organizational structures.23
22See La¤ont and Maskin (1980) for the di¤erentiable approach of dominant strategy mechanisms in
settings with monetary transfers. The revealed preferences argument used above does not depend on
whether monetary transfers are available or not.
23In the case of a single agent, Alonso and Matouschek (2005) and Martimort and Semenov (2006)
provided also conditions under which continuity is obtained at the optimal mechanism. A uniform
distribution of types is enough to obtain this continuity. In an earlier version of the present paper, we
took into account the possibility that feasible incentive compatible mechanisms may also be discontinuous.
We actually proved that the optimal grand-mechanism is indeed continuous in the two-agent case still
with a uniform distribution of types. Given that result, we have chosen to simplify the presentation by
a priori restricting ourselves to the analysis of continuous grand-mechanisms.
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Of particular importance in the sequel are the following mechanisms which depend
on only two parameters  and : These parameters dene various areas where the
implemented policy is rigid, i.e., does not depend on both interest groupspreferences but
at most of those of only one:24
q(1; 2) =
8>>><>>>:
 if max f1; 2g  
max f1; 2g if   max f1; 2g  
 if min f1; 2g    max f1; 2g
min f1; 2g if   min f1; 2g :
(4)
Proposition 1 : The optimal dominant strategy incentive compatible and continuous
grand-mechanism when interest groups compete has the form given in (4).
i) For 0   < 1
4
, there are two cut-o¤s d() = 2 and 

d () =
1
2
+ 2;
ii) For 1
2
   1
4
, there is only one cut-o¤ d() = 2 and the optimal policy is
q(1; 2) = minfd();maxf1; 2gg;
iii) For   1
2
, optimal policy is fully rigid and equal to qp.
Under competition, the optimal policy might be more exible than the policy with-
out any communication. It might indeed depend explicitly on the groupspreferences,
although it cannot, at the same time depend on both groupsideal points and has nec-
essarily to be biased towards a single interest group. This corresponds to regions in the
(1; 2) space where there is e¤ective screening of the preferences of this selected interest
group. This screening e¤ect captures the benets of competition.
To understand why such unilateral screening occurs, it should be reminded that there
is more screening between a single group and the legislature and the implemented policy is
more exible as their conict of interests is less pronounced.25 With two interest groups,
the same logic applies but in a more complex way. The virtual conict of interests
between the rst interest group and the policy-maker now depends on the preferences of
the second one. This virtual conict will typically be equal to
0 =  +
1 + 2
2
  1 =    (1   2)
2
:
This virtual conict is a decreasing function of the distancebetween the interest groups
ideal points when 1  2. As this distance increases, the principals ideal point is closer
24It will be shown in the Appendix that the optimal mechanism is necessarily in this class.
25This is a point made by Melumad and Shibano (1991) in a screening context but this e¤ect also
occurs in the case of signalling games à la Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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to that of the interest group with the highest ideal point. Everything happens as if
an endogenous bias of the decision process towards that interest group appears. Given
that the implemented policy cannot depend on both interest groups ideal points, the
legislature prefers to have the ideal point of the closests group being selected.
The optimal mechanism with competing groups has two cut-o¤s only when  is su¢ -
ciently small. Since under competition a mechanism depends at most on the preferences
of only one group at the time, introducing a cut-o¤  might be benecial to avoid having
only one groups preferences being represented too often in circumstances when there is
much congruence between the legislature and each group.
4 Coalitional Behavior
Di¤erent norms of collusive behavior between interest groups may emerge depending on
the technology available for sharing of information within a coalition, the ability of those
groups to enforce credible information sharing and their capacity to punish deviations
from a collusive agreement by member groups. In the sequel, we will analyze di¤erent
norms and relate them to various behaviors that interest groups may entertain.
Third-Party Mediated Collusion: Following La¤ont and Martimort (1997, 2000), the
collusive behavior of interest groups is modelled as being organized by a third-party. This
third-party acts as a broker for the coalition and maximizes the gains he withdraws from
organizing the collusive behavior.26
This modelling device has two main motivations. The rst motivation is related to the
practical means by which interest groups collude in the political arena. Political scientists
agree on the fact that interest groups are joining coalitions for information. For instance,
Laumann and Knoke (1987) and Heinz et al. (1990) examined information exchanges
between group dyads and argued that it is key to intergroup coordination. Hula (1999,
Chapter 4) also reported that interest groups are linked by the career paths of their sta¤
members and that a phenomenon akin to the revolving dooroccurs between the public
and the private sectors also takes place across interest groups. This phenomenon certainly
facilitates information ow between otherwise distinct organizations. Almost all organiza-
tions active in the U.S. politics have a board of directors, and those boards are interlocked
through knitted relationships which provide e¢ cient means of information sharing and
resources for members of the sta¤of those organizations, as noticed by Hula (1999, p. 65).
In practice, these agents act as brokers between the objectives of the di¤erent groups in-
26In La¤ont and Martimort (1997 and 2000), it is instead assumed that the third-party is benevolent
and maximizes the sum of the expected payo¤s of the colluding partners. Having the third-party as a
budget breaker corresponds in fact to the real world institutional practices found in the case of interest
groups coalitions as we argue below.
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volved as noticed by Loomis (1986). The third-party of our modelling device can then be
viewed as a metaphor for the common board members of di¤erent organizations involved
in a coalition. Relatedly, political consulting rms provide specialized services and act
in the political arena as pro-active advocates for special interests. Those actors, whose
importance in current politics cannot be overlooked,27 also provide examples of potential
third-parties facilitating communication with key political decision-makers and helping
interest groups organize active coalitions.28
The second motivation for our modelling device is theoretical. Relying on an unin-
formed mediator to organize the collusive ring helps to model the bargaining procedure
between colluding groups as a black-box. Those procedures are dynamic in nature but,
using the approach of Myerson and Sattherthwaite (1983), they can also be viewed as
static mechanisms without having to worry about details of the bargaining.
Side-Mechanisms: Before learning about the types of the colluding partners, the third-
party commits to a side-mechanism that is o¤ered to the agents. This side-mechanism
rst stipulates a manipulation of the reports (1; 2) = (1(1; 2) ; 2(1; 2)) that the
interest groups collectively make to their principal, second a side-transfer ti(1; 2) that
interest group i gives back to the third-party in exchange for organizing collusion.
Two assumptions are made which give its best chances to collusion. First, by assuming
commitment to a side-mechanism, we short-cut the issue of enforcement of that collusive
behavior although, in practice, interest groups might rely on their repeated relationships
to enforce this agreement.29
Second, we also allow for side-transfers within the side-mechanism. Two interpreta-
tions can be given for those side-transfers. First, they can also be viewed as the shares
of the interest groupsresources that are pocketed by the broker in exchange of his ser-
vices in lobbying decision-makers (this will typically be the case if collusion between the
interest groups is organized by a political consulting rm). Given that the third-party
may act as a budget-breaker, we certainly obtain there an upper bound on what can be
collectively achieved by interest groups when coordinating their behavior. Second, side-
transfers can be viewed as continuation values of the relationship if we were explicitly
modelling collusion between interest groups as a repeated game. Of course, this issue of
enforcement is less relevant if we keep in mind the interpretation of the third-party as a
political consulting rm with whom private contracts may be signed and enforced.
27In the U.S., the American Association of Political Consultants counts more than 1,100 active mem-
bers.
28As a recent example, we might refer to the case of the health reform in the U.S. where some active
lobbying has been taken place over summer 2007 under the aegis of Small Business California, a political
consulting rm acting on behalf of some of the largest U.S. rms.
29Tirole (1992) and Martimort (1999) presented models of such self-enforceable collusive behavior. The
lessons of those models are quite close to those obtained by assuming enforceability of the side-mechanism.
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Several justications can be found for allowing side-transfers within the coalition.
First, and on practical grounds, many public policies severely limit transfers towards pri-
vate interests. A typical example would be regulatory policies in the U.S. where direct
transfers to regulated rms (viewed as interest groups) are banned. At the same time,
there is no such limit on the private contracts that link interest groups to the political
consulting rms that might represent them in the political arena. Second, and on more
theoretical grounds, our modelling choices can be viewed as a metaphor for cases where
it is simply easier to transfer money (or more generally utility streams if those transfers
are viewed as continuation values of the relationships) between interest groups rather
than between those groups and the legislature as a whole. This will typically be the case
in a repeated relationship environment since, due to reelection concerns, the legislature
might certainly be modelled as a short-term principal facing long-term players (the in-
terest groups). Such short-term principal is de facto unable to commit to any rewards or
punishments to facilitate information revelation whereas such schemes are possible within
on-going coalitions of long-term players.30
Distinguishing between strong and weak coalitions: In the following, we will ana-
lyze two di¤erent norms of collusive behavior which vary both in terms of the instruments
available to enforce collusive behavior and in the degree of credible information sharing
that they might reach. That classication, although extreme, provides some modelling
for di¤erent kinds of coalitions that political scientists have highlighted. For instance,
Lauman and Knoke (1987) examined information exchanges between group dyads by dif-
ferentiating groups sharing casual information (modelled below as weak coalitions) from
those sharing more condential information (modelled as strong coalitions). Of course, the
extent of information sharing may depend on the career paths of sta¤ members of those
groups or of those political consulting rms which organize their collusion. It may also
depend on the kind of political issue under scrutiny and whether it involves long-lasting
interests or not.
In a strong coalition, interest groups share information perfectly regarding their prefer-
ences by the mere fact of colluding. In other words, the third-party organizing collusion is
endowed with a costless technology to get access to the groupsideal points and to release
this information within the coalition. Of course, the third-party still has incentives to
manipulate information when communicating with the legislature. Using the expression
coined by Baron and Besanko (1999) in an I.O. context, information is internally veriable
although it cannot be externally veried by the legislature. One possible justication for
this information structure can again be found by viewing our model as a short-cut for
repeated relationships. Whenever groups are long-term players facing a legislature whose
30Of course, these justications would deserve a full-edged dynamic model. We leave it for further
research.
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commitment power is limited by a nite horizon, one may expect coalitions to be better
able to credibly share information internally than with the legislature.
In practice, this kind of strong collusive behavior is expected when a set of well-
dened interest groups (often referred to as the coalition core in the political science
literature31) have long-lasting common interests. Take the example of transportation.
This eld involves long-lasting business interests gathered in trade associations such as
the American Bus Association and the Air Transport Association. Core players in such
a coalition have developed expertise on relevant issues, spent time and resources and
repeatedly interacted in the past so that they have learned their preferences over time.
These associations are certainly better modelled as strong coalitions.
Instead, in a weak coalition, interest groups must be given incentives to reveal private
information on their preferences. Weak coalitions are expected on issues which happen
unexpectedly at a given time and involve actors which may not have developed strong
expertise on the policies at stake. An example in order is the recent lobbying on health
reform in the U.S. where large business rms which were beforehand uninvolved in the
health sector have formed lobbying coalitions but may have di¢ culties in gauging how
much member groups wants to strive for a health reform.32
Enforcement: If a member group deviates and refuses the collusive agreement, the two
groups non-cooperatively play the grand-mechanism o¤ered by the legislature. Of course,
the equilibrium concept will depend on the kind of coalition that breaks apart.
Consider a given grand-mechanism fq(^1; ^2)g(^1;^2)22 and a strong coalition where
member groups know each others preferences. A pair of reporting strategy (not neces-
sarily truthful) (^

1; ^

2) forms a Nash equilibrium of that mechanism when
^

i 2 argmin
^i
(q(^i; ^

 i)  i)2:
The benet of the deviation for an agent i with type i can thus be computed as:
vdi (i;  i) =  
1
2
(q(^

i ; ^

 i)  i)2: (5)
Given the symmetry of the model, we are looking for grand-mechanisms q() which are
themselves symmetric so that vdi () will not depend on the deviating agents identity i and
we will omit indices accordingly.
31Hula (2000).
32Sometimes, even long term players may be reluctant to share information. Lauman and Knoke
(1987) reported the example of the petroleum industry trade associations which strongly opposed the
announcement of the Federal Aviation Administration to execute new regulations requiring detailed ight
plans to be led by pilots of non-commercial aircrafts since that would make public the strategic data of
their aerial explorations that are worth millions of dollars.
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Instead, for a weak coalition, there is asymmetric information within the coalition.
The non-deviating agent  i must thus form out-of-equilibrium beliefs on agent is type
when contemplating the latters deviation while the deviating group still holds prior beliefs
on agent  i since the latter has not deviated. Given that pair of beliefs, both groups now
play a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. To simplify that step of analysis, we will follow La¤ont
and Martimort (1997, 2000) and consider passive beliefs, i.e., the non-deviating agent does
not change his beliefs on the deviating agent and still keep the uniform prior on [0; 1]. A
Bayesian-Nash (symmetric) equilibrium strategy ^

(i)
33 satises thus:
^

(i) 2 argmin
^i
E i(q(^i; ^

( i))  i)2:
The benet of the deviation for an agent i with type i can thus be computed as:
vd(i) = E i

 1
2
(q(^

(i); ^

( i))  i)2

: (6)
5 Strong Coalitions
By assuming credible information sharing in a strong coalition, we get an upper bound
of the benets that any coalition of interest groups could withdraw. This is important in
view of our comparative analysis of organizational forms. Whenever competition between
interest groups increases the groupspayo¤s with respect to such strong norm of collusion,
it will also be the case if the coalitional behavior of those groups is not as perfect as it is
assumed in a strong coalition.
With a strong norm of collusive behavior, recall that collusion takes place under com-
plete information between the colluding interest groups. The optimal side-mechanism
must thus solve the following problem:
(TP sc) : max
f(1;2);t1(1;2);t2(1;2)g
2X
i=1
ti(1; 2)
subject to
Ui(i;  i)  vd(i;  i); i = 1; 2; 8(i;  i) 2 2; (7)
where vd(i;  i) satises (6) and the interest group is utility can be written as:
Ui(i;  i) =  1
2
(q((1; 2))  i)2   ti(i;  i): (8)
33Assuming one such equilibrium exists as it will be shown later.
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Under complete information the best collusive manipulation (1; 2) that can be achieved
by the interest groups does not depend on the reservation payo¤s obtained following a
deviation. This manipulation solely minimizes point-wise the following expression:
1
2
2X
i=1
(q()  i)2 =

q()  1 + 2
2
2
+
(2   1)2
4
: (9)
Up to some terms which do not depend on the policy chosen and thus cannot be screened
by the grand-mechanism, the third-partys payo¤ only depends on the agentsaverage
ideal point. When communicating with the uninformed principal, the coalition behaves
as a single consolidated interest group having a type  = 1
2
(1 + 2) now drawn from the
distribution G() of the averagebetween two independent variables uniformly distrib-
uted on [0; 1]. The corresponding distribution G() is:
G() =
(
22 if 0    1
2
1  2(1  )2 if 1    1
2
;
which admits the density g()
g() =
(
4 if 0    1
2
4  4 if 1    1
2
:
Compared to a uniform distribution, G() shifts more weight around the same mean.
One may already guess that this certainly reduces the need for a strong coalition to
communicate with the principal. In other words, a commitment by the legislature to a
rigid policy close to the expected average ideal point, namely 1=2, is likely to perform
relatively well given that the inverse U-shape distribution puts quite a bit of mass around
that point.
To conrm that insight, let us analyze the optimal grand-mechanism for a strong
coalition. Of course, a version of the Revelation Principle still holds in our context
although incentive constraints for truthtelling must be adapted to take into account the
interest groupscollusive behavior. Again, focusing on deterministic mechanisms, there
is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to direct mechanisms which satisfy
coalition incentive constraints, i.e., such that the third-party adopts a truthtelling strategy
(1; 2) = (1; 2). Such a grand-mechanism is said to be collusion-proof.34
The corresponding strong coalitional incentive constraints can be written as:
(1; 2) = arg min
(^1;^2)
(q(^1; ^2)  )2: (10)
34Our notion of collusion-proofness is somewhat weaker than that developed in La¤ont and Marti-
mort (1997, 2000). Indeed grand-mechanisms do not specify transfers between interest groups and thus
cannot replicate what can be done with side-mechanisms employing such transfers. Nevertheless grand-
mechanisms can be designed in such a way that reports are not manipulable by a strong coalition.
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We can easily prove that q() depends only on the average ideal point  and we will
slightly abuse notations by writing q(). To do so, observe that all pairs (1; 2) with the
same mean  = 1
2
(1 + 2) should, from (10), correspond to the same policy. Looking at
the coalition incentive compatibility o¤ such diagonal, we immediately obtain that q() is
monotonically increasing and thus almost everywhere di¤erentiable in .
At any point of di¤erentiability, the strong coalition incentive constraint becomes:
_q()(q()  ) = 0; 8 2 : (11)
Hence, q() is either locally constant along any diagonal  = 1
2
(1 + 2) or equal to the
third-partys ideal point which is an average over the groupsown ideal points. This leads
to the following characterization of the strong collusion-proof mechanisms.35
Lemma 2 : Any strong collusion-proof continuous mechanism q() depends only on the
average ideal points of the interest groups, namely  = 1
2
(1 + 2). Such mechanism is
characterized by two cut-o¤s  and  with   :
q() = minf;maxf; gg: (12)
In other words, everything happens as though the legislature was dealing only with
the third-party and either let it choose its most preferred point within the range [; ]
or imposes a rigid policy either at  or .
Proposition 2 : The optimal strong collusion-proof continuous mechanism is character-
ized by a unique cut-o¤ sc() satisfying for   12 :Z sc()
0
(sc()     )g()d = 0: (13)
i) For   1
6
, sc() = 3,
ii) For 1
6
   1
2
, sc() solves
(sc()  )(12(sc())2   24sc() + 6) + 12(sc())2   8(sc())3   1 = 0; (14)
iii) For   1
2
, the optimal policy is fully rigid and equal to qp.
35See Martimort and Semenov (2006) for such characterization.
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From (12), it should be clear that the optimal strong collusion-proof mechanism entails
only a lower bound on the possible policies at a threshold . Such lower bound ensures
that the incentives of the third-party for understating the average preferences of the
member groups no longer matter if this average is small enough. On the other hand,
introducing an upper bound on the set of possible policies can only increase the distance
between the principals ideal point and that of a strong coalition in case  is large enough.
This is not optimal from the legislatures viewpoint.
Proposition 2 already suggests a basic tension that drives the formation of a strong
coalition. On one hand, by dealing with such a coalition, communication with the legisla-
ture becomes less essential and the optimal policy comes close to what would be obtained
with an ex ante commitment to a rigid rule. On the other hand, and from an ex-ante
viewpoint, interest groups may be reluctant to form such a coalition. Contrary to what
occurs when groups compete, the respective ideal points of each group are now never
chosen because either communication has less value for the legislature or, when commu-
nication leads to a exible policy, this is only an aggregate of the preferences of both
interest groups which is used to determine that policy.
6 Weak Coalitions
Interest groups in a weak coalition can no longer credibly share information among them-
selves. Any side-mechanism thus has also be incentive compatible. Asymmetric informa-
tion may signicantly undermine the e¢ ciency of such collusive agreements. One impor-
tant question is to know whether collusion might still help the principal even though a
weak collusion itself su¤ers from asymmetric information problems.
With a weak norm of collusive behavior, collusion takes place under asymmetric in-
formation. Relying on Bayesian incentive compatibility as the implementation concept
within the coalition, a side-mechanism must satisfy the following Bayesian incentive con-
straints:
i 2 argmax
^i
E i

 1
2
(q((^i;  i))  i)2   ti(^i;  i)

; i = 1; 2; 8(i; ^i;  i) 2 3:
(15)
From (15), we can easily prove that E i(q((i;  i)) is monotonically increasing in each
of its arguments and thus almost everywhere di¤erentiable in i.36
To stress the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency of a collective manipulation of reports and
rent extraction of the interest groupsinformation rent within a weak coalition, we express
36This second-order condition can easily be checked ex-post on the optimal weak collusion-proof mech-
anism.
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incentive constraints in terms of the interim utility Ui(i) of a group with type i:
Ui(i) = max
^i
E i

 1
2
(q((^i;  i))  i)2   ti(^i;  i)

: (16)
Using (16) and the Envelope Theorem, we obtain
_Ui(i) = E i (q((i;  i))  i) ; i = 1; 2; 8(i;  i) 2 2: (17)
To induce acceptance of the collusive agreement, it must be that
Ui(i)  vd(i); i = 1; 2; 8(i;  i) 2 2; (18)
where vd(i) is dened in (6).
The third-partys problem can thus be rewritten as:
(TPwc) : min
f();U1();U2()g
E(1;2)
(
q( (1; 2))  1 + 2
2
2
+
(2   1)2
4
)
+
2X
i=1
EiUi(i)
subject to (17) and (18).
Problem (TPwc) is a priori complex because of the type-dependent participation constraint
(18) and the di¢ culty in knowing a priori where this constraint actually binds. Moreover,
another di¢ culty is that (TPwc) itself depends on the grand-mechanism chosen by the
principal. The legislature thus may o¤er a mechanism with an eye on how information
undermines the e¢ ciency of a side-mechanism for a weak coalition. To simplify the
analysis, we will focus on grand-mechanisms such that the ex-post participation constraint
(18) binds at  = 0.37 We can then write the interest groupsinformation rent as:
Ui(i) = v
d(0) +
Z i
0
E i (q((x;  i))  x) dx: (19)
Integrating by parts in the maximand of (TPwc) yields an objective of the third-party
which is an expectation of terms writing as:
q()  1 + 2
2
2
+
2X
i=1
(1  i)(q()  i): (20)
Of course, the optimal manipulation function () must be such that (18) holds, which
requires: Z i
0
E i (q(
(x;  i))  x) dx  vd(i)  vd(0) 8i: (21)
37We characterize in the Appendix the polar class of mechanisms where the participation constraint
(7) binds instead at  = 1. As we will prove there, such collusion-proof grand-mechanisms imply full
pooling. This gives some motivation for focusing on those grand-mechanisms such that the participation
constraint (7) binds at  = 0 as far as exible policies are concerned.
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We will neglect this constraint and check ex-post that it holds with the optimal weak
collusion-proof mechanism found below.
As before, a version of the Revelation Principle still applies and there is no loss of
generality in restricting the analysis to mechanisms (again focusing on deterministic ones)
such that the optimal manipulation of reports obtained by point-wise optimization is
truthful. This leads us to express the following weak coalition incentive compatibility
constraints:
(1; 2) = arg min
(^1;^2)
(q(^1; ^2)  )2 +
2X
i=1
(1  i)(q(^1; ^2)  i): (22)
From (22), we can again easily prove that q() depends only on the average ideal points
. Moreover, q() is monotonically increasing and thus almost everywhere di¤erentiable
in . At any point of di¤erentiability, the weak coalition incentive constraints can thus
be written as:
_q()(q()  2 + 1) = 0; 8 2 : (23)
Hence, q() is either locally constant along the diagonal  = 1
2
(1 + 2) or equal to the
third-partys virtual ideal point 2   1.
When the participation constraint (7) only binds at  = 0, interest groups have some
incentives to understate their ideal points. By doing so, they signal a lower willingness
to pay for the brokers services in organizing collusion. To reduce these incentives to
understate types, this third-party commits to a side-mechanism inducing a downward
distortion of the optimal manipulation of reports away from the e¢ cient one that would
be chosen in a strong coalition. Instead of maximizing the sum of the interest groups
payo¤s, the optimal manipulation now trades o¤ internal e¢ ciency within the coalition
against the costly information rents which must be left to interest groups with the highest
ideal points who have less incentives to renege on collusion. Everything happens as though,
within a weak coalition, the ideal points i were now replaced by virtual ideal points 2i 1
which are necessarily lower to capture the downward bias of a weak coalition. This leads
to the following characterization of the weak collusion-proof mechanisms.
Lemma 3 : Any weak collusion-proof and continuous mechanism q() such that the par-
ticipation constraint (7) binds at  = 0 and satisfyingZ i
0
E i(q(x;  i)  x)dx  vd(i)  vd(0) 8i; (24)
depends only on the average ideal points of the interest groups  = 1
2
(1 + 2). This
mechanism can be characterized by two cut-o¤s  and  with    such that:
q() = minf;maxf2   1; gg: (25)
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With such a mechanism, the range of possible policies is still [; ] exactly as with a
strong collusion-proof one having the same cut-o¤s as in (12). The di¤erence comes from
the fact that, under a weak coalition, a exible policy is more sensitive to a change in the
average preferences of the member groups whereas a strong collusion-proof mechanism
corresponds to a policy closer to the legislatures ideal point. There is less congruence
with a weak coalition than with its strong counterpart.
Proposition 3 : i) The optimal weak collusion-proof continuous mechanism is charac-
terized by an upper bound on policy wc() = 1 and a lower bound 

wc() satisfying for
  1
2
: Z wc()+1
2
0
(wc()     )g()d = 0: (26)
Optimal policies are more rigid with a weak coalition than with a strong one in the sense
that:
wc() + 1
2
> sc():
Moreover, wc(0) > 0, i.e, even with no a priori conict of interests, the optimal policy
with a weak coalition entails some rigidity.
ii) For   1
2
, the optimal policy is fully rigid and equal to qp.
Since virtual ideal points replace true ideal points to assess the preferences of a weak
coalition, there exists an extra bias between the principal and that coalition. Even if
there is a priori no conict of interests between the principal and the coalition ( = 0)
asymmetric information within the coalition introduces such a conict and precludes a
fully exible policy rule. More generally, the exacerbated conict of interests between the
legislature and a weak coalition calls for more rigid rules than with a strong coalition.
The di¢ culty of communicating information on preferences internally within the weak
coalition also makes communication with the principal more di¢ cult.
7 Optimal Organization of Lobbying
We now compare the outcomes achieved when interest groups either compete or adopt
more collusive behavior. We want to stress the costs and benets of each organizational
form. To do so, we will use two criteria. The rst one is the legislatures expected
payo¤ under the various organizational forms. This will give us some insights on the
social incentives for either having competition or collusion between groups. The second
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criterion consists in comparing the interest groupsexpected payo¤ when they compete
with what they get together with the third-party organizing their coalition if a more
collusive behavior is adopted. This approach will instead stress the private incentives for
competing or colluding.
As a preliminary remark, Propositions 1 and 2 show that optimal policies entail some
exibility only when   1
2
whether interest groups compete or instead collude in a strong
coalition. Of course, this does not mean that the legislatures expected payo¤s in both
cases are the same since the degree of exibility is di¤erent. For   1
2
, a rigid policy is
chosen for any organizational form and thus all such forms are payo¤-equivalent.
Proposition 4 : The following rankings in payo¤s hold:
 There exists  < 1
2
such that a strong coalition dominates competition from a social
point of view if and only if  2 [; 1
2
];
 There exists  2  ; 1
2

such that a strong coalition dominates competition from a
private viewpoint if and only if  2 [; 1
2
].
The main idea behind this proposition is to compare the optimal mechanism for a
strong coalition with a dominant strategy mechanism of the kind described in (4) dealing
with both groups separately. To do so, the following gure is useful.
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On Figure 1, we have drawn the downward sloping line 1+2
2
= sc() which separates
the areas A+B where a strong coalition receives a pooling policy from the area C where
the ideal point of this coalition is implemented. On C, isopolicy lines are 450 downward
sloping lines. They do not correspond to any of the interest groupsideal points except of
course when there is no heterogeneity in their preferences and both interest groups have
the same ideal points.
Consider now a dominant strategy mechanism of type (4) having only one oor policy
 = sc().
38 On area A, this mechanism is pooling and yields to the principal the same
expected payo¤ as the optimal strong collusion-proof mechanism since the policy chosen
is the same in both cases.
On area B, dealing separately with non-cooperating interest groups allows us to im-
plement a policy which depends on the preferences of the group who has the highest ideal
point. Screening, although imperfect and biased towards one group, is possible, whereas
dealing with a coalition would still entail a fully rigid policy. Everything happens thus as
though an endogenous bias of the decision process towards the interest group whose ideal
point is the closest to that of the principal appears. Instead, the mechanism dealing with
a strong coalition is unable to account for this endogenous bias.
On area C, dealing with a coalition allows a more e¢ cient communication with the
principal since only the statistic 1+2
2
is relevant for decision-making and isopolicy lines
cannot depend on this statistic with dominant strategy. However, since the density of
the average type 1+2
2
decreases over [sc(); 1], this potential benet of a coalition is
not su¢ ciently strong to o¤set the cost of an excessive pooling when the interest groups
preferences are su¢ ciently far apart.
To give further intuition on the benets of competition, let us consider the case of a
su¢ ciently strong conict of interests. Of course for  = 1
2
there is full pooling with both
organizations reaching the same welfare. Assume now that  = 1
2
  " for " small enough.
With a strong coalition, sc() is close to 1 and the optimal policy is almost full pooling.
The area C where the policy is exible is then a small triangle having an area of order "2.
The gain of dealing with a strong coalition rather than imposing pooling everywhere is
thus of order "2. Instead, by having competing interest groups, the principal can screen
preferences on areas B +C and obtain a gain of order " everywhere. This dimensionality
argument underscores the benet of competition at least if the conict of interests between
the legislature and the groups is su¢ ciently pronounced.
For small values of  instead, the 450 degree line 1+2
2
= sc() lies on the very south-
west of the [0; 1]  [0; 1] square. The policy with a strong coalition is very exible and
38The mechanism on Figure 1 is a dominant strategy mechanism but is not optimal. The optimal
dominant strategy mechanism will perform better.
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the communicated statistic perfectly ts with what is needed by the legislature to choose
the policy. Clearly, dealing with such coalition now dominates. When  is close to zero,
there is full congruence between the legislature and a strong coalition with the optimal
policy being fully exible. Relying on competition is clearly suboptimal. Indeed, under
competition, isopolicy lines are never aligned with those of the legislature contrary to
what happens with a strong coalition.
Proposition 4 shows that interest groups also gain from being split for su¢ ciently large
. Indeed, when they remain separated, there is a positive probability that the optimal
policy ts their ideal points. This benet is su¢ ciently strong to dominate the cost of
having the other interest groups ideal point being implemented with positive probability
when the latter has su¢ ciently pronounced preferences. Instead, the average policy that
would be chosen with a strong coalition never coincides with the ideal points of either
agent except, with probability zero, when these ideal points are equal and above sc().
When instead  is small enough, the strong coalitions objectives are perfectly aligned
with those of the principal and the optimal policy is fully exible. Under competition
instead, the optimal policy entails a cap d () close to
1
2
and thus much pooling. The
principal and the interest groups all gain from having a strong coalition. Thus one should
expect less (respectively more) interest groups and more (respectively less) collusion in
environments with little (respectively signicant) conicts since communication is less
costly there. To a large extent, the social and private incentives to form a strong coalition
are aligned.
Our previous results showed that a strong coalition may be preferred by the principal
since it may be the best way to reduce the conict of interests with interest groups. At rst
glance, one might conjecture that a weak coalition could still help the principal, because
it might somewhat help coordination between the interest groups. The next proposition
shows that it is actually not the case.
Proposition 5 : i) The legislatures expected payo¤ with a weak coalition is always
strictly lower than with a strong coalition.
ii) Competition dominates a weak coalition both from a social and a private viewpoint.
Proposition 5 shows that asymmetric information within the coalition always hurts the
principal. The principal prefers that interest groups credibly share information within a
strong coalition since the distance between the principals ideal point and that of such
coalition is thereby reduced. Under asymmetric information, this distance increases be-
cause one must add to the preferences bias  some extra terms coming from the fact that
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the virtual ideal point of a weak coalition is distorted downwards and further apart from
the legislatures preferences than if a strong coalition would form.
As a result of Propositions 4 and 5, either competition dominates any coalitional form
from a social and a private viewpoint (for large conicts of interests) or a strong coalition
dominates competition (and a weak coalition) from a social and a private perspective, in
the case of low conicts of interests.
8 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
Interest groups may adopt various kinds of behavior in day-to-day legislative politics using
either very competitive or more collusive strategies. This paper has investigated the conse-
quences of di¤erent organizations of lobbying in relation to the pattern of communication
and the degree of exibility of optimal policies that respond to those organizations. Our
main message is that strong coalitions with credible information sharing among member
groups are both socially and privately optimal when their preferences are congruent with
the rest of society. Weak coalitions are instead always suboptimal both from a private and
a social viewpoint. This points to the key role of core players who have long-term inter-
ests at stake in organizing coalitional behavior in the political arena. When conicts are
instead exacerbated, a competitive playing eld is both socially and privately preferred.
Concerning the robustness of our results, it could be useful to generalize our model
to account for other functional forms for the groupsutility functions although quadratic
preferences are good approximations for most single-peaked functions. The same analysis
would characterize the competition case: At most one groups ideal point might be chosen.
Regarding the analysis of strong coalitions, the third-party would still represent the joint
interest of member groups although isopolicy lines would be downward sloping curves
and certainly no longer along the diagonal. It is rather clear that our intuitive argument
justifying why competition dominates a strong coalition in the case of large conicts of
interests would still go through: Starting from the minimal level of conict inducing full
pooling with a strong coalition and reducing by a small amount  this level of conict, the
optimal policy with a strong coalition is exible only for a set of size 2 in the preferences
space whereas screening occurs on a set of size  if competition is chosen. This argument
is also robust to changes in the distribution of preferences as long as densities are smooth
and positive everywhere.
Our analysis might also be worth generalizing to the case where interest groups have
di¤erent biases with the decision-maker. As long as groups have preferences which are at
least ex-ante su¢ ciently close even though they may di¤er ex-post, we expect our results
to carry over. However, we conjecture that competition dominates when groups have
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asymmetric biases with the legislature but the optimal mechanism is certainly no longer
symmetric. Indeed, following the general thrust of the paper, the best organizational form
should make the legislatures choice more congruent with those of the groups. This can
certainly be so in case when one group has preferences which are close to those of the
legislature by communicating only with that group in an asymmetric dominant strategy
mechanism. Coalitional behavior is thus less likely with asymmetric biases. This also
suggests that competition certainly dominates when groups have opposite biases, one
preferring lesspolicy than the socially optimal one whereas the other prefers more.
Other robustness checks should address the choice of the information structure by,
for instance, allowing some correlation between the various interest groupsideal points.
When the groupsideal points are highly correlated, there is little value of competition
under dominant strategy39 and dealing with a strong coalition certainly dominates. When
the groupsideal points are rather negatively correlated instead, it might be rather inef-
cient to deal with a coalition since not much can be learned from its reports on joint
interests. Finally, a particular information structure which has received much attention
in the literature has interest groups receive signals on an underlying state of nature which
a¤ects the choice of an optimal policy and those signals are conditionally independent.40
We feel relatively condent that our results would generalize to this case, but this of
course should be investigated more thoroughly.
Our modelling of the formation of coalitions gave us a clear characterization of collusion-
proof grand-mechanisms. However, it somewhat short-cuts a number of issues which arise
when the collusive side-mechanism is o¤ered by one informed interest group himself: a
core player" (in the vocabulary of the political science literature) willing to attract other
member groups in his own coalition. Informational leakages towards other groups coming
from the mere signalling by that core player of his incentives to form a coalition might
be worth studying. More generally, our welfare comparison between competition and
collusion has taken an ex-ante viewpoint but one could also be interested in determining
what kinds of interest groups are more eager to coalesce or to compete and the dynamic
pattern in which groups join on-going coalitions.
One might nd some tension between two assumptions we made in our analysis, namely
allowing side-transfers between colluding groups and not allowing side-transfers between
those groups and the legislature. Although we have justied this assumption above,
it might be worth investigating how our results could be modied in the case where
transfers between the legislature and the groups are allowed. The same kind of issues has
been investigated in an I.O. context where a downstream rm wants to build a network
of its suppliers and use monetary transfers to do so. Baron and Besanko (1992, 1999),
39This is also a case where Bayesian implementation might be quite useful.
40See for instance Battaglini and Benabou (2003) and Wolinsky (2002).
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Dana (1993), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), La¤ont and Martimort (1998), Mookherjee and
Tsugamari (2004) and Dequiedt and Martimort (2004) (among many others) have found
conditions on preferences and information under which dealing with a strong coalition of
suppliers dominates both a decentralized mechanism where suppliers keep on competing
and a weak coalition of suppliers. In the framework where transfers between the principal
and agents are feasible, this literature shows that such strong coalition may help groups to
internalize informational externalities. This suggests that the benets of strong coalition
could be greater in our context if transfers were allowed. This is true although transfers
also signicantly enlarge the set of policies that can be implemented when groups compete
since it is no longer true that the legislature reduces to use mechanisms depending only on
one of the groupspreferences. Keeping in mind the interpretation of transfers as streams
of future utilities in continued relationships, this suggests also that strong coalitions are
likely to emerge in dynamic contexts.
Returning to our initial context where transfers are not allowed between the legis-
lature and groups, the organization of lobbying that emerges might also depend on the
specication of the policy-makers objective function and it may be worth studying to
which extent it is so. We have assumed that the principal is a social welfare maximizer
choosing an average between the interest groups ideal points and that of the general
public. Instead, they could choose a policy corresponding to the median of the public and
the interest groups ideal points, or a policy which might result from some unspecied
legislative bargaining among representatives of di¤erent constituencies. The point here
is that the social choice process that leads to a particular policy might have some con-
sequences on the macro-organization of interest groups which are worth studying.41 The
whole pattern of communication, transaction costs and organizational forms of lobbying
could be modied accordingly.
We hope to investigate some of these issues in future research.
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Appendix
 Proof of Lemma 1: From Melumad and Shibano (1991) and Martimort and Semenov
(2006), we can remind the characterization of one-dimensional mechanisms in a framework
with a single privately informed agent:
Lemma 4 : Any uni-dimensional incentive compatible continuous deterministic mecha-
nism ~q() must satisfy
(~q()  ) _~q() = 0; (A1)
and is of the form
~q() = minf;maxf; gg; (A2)
where  and  are two thresholds such that   .
Take now an arbitrary continuous dominant strategy mechanism q(1; 2) in a set-
ting with two interest groups acting non-cooperatively. Fix 2 and consider the one-
dimensional scheme ~q(1) = q(1; 2). From Lemma 4, this mechanism can be written
as:
q(1; 2) = ~q(1) = minf(2)(2);maxf1; (1)(2)gg; (A3)
where (2)(2)  (1)(2) 82.
Again from Lemma 4, we can compute (1)(2) and 
(2)(2) and get
(1)(2) = minf1 ;maxf2; gg
for some thresholds 1 and 
 such that   1 ; and
(2)(2) = minf;maxf2; 2 gg
for some thresholds 2 and 
 such that 2  . Moreover, (2)(2)  (1)(2) 82
implies also that   2 and 1  .
Coming back to (A3) and observing thatmaxfx;minfy; zgg = minfmaxfx; yg;maxfx; zgg;
we obtain :
q(1; 2) = minf;maxf1; 1 g;maxf2; 2 g;maxf1; 2; gg; (A4)
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which yields (3) for a symmetric mechanism such that 1 = 

2 = 
:
 Proof of Proposition 1: We rst prove that the optimal grand-mechanism with
non-cooperating interest groups is indeed of the form given in (4), i.e., it has only two
thresholds. Denote by Vd(
; ; ) the legislatures expected payo¤ with a dominant
strategy incentive compatible scheme of the form (3). Using symmetry and taking into
account equation (3), we get:
Vd(
; ; ) =
 
Z 
0
 Z 1
0

   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2
!
d1| {z }
q(1;2)=

 
Z 

Z 1
0

1   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2| {z }
q(1;2)=1
d1
 
Z 

f
Z 
0

   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2| {z }
q(1;2)=
=minf;1;g
+
Z 1


2   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2| {z }
q(1;2)=2=minf;1;2g
gd1
 
Z 1

f
Z 
0

   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2| {z }
q(1;2)=
=minf;g
 
Z 


2   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2| {z }
q(1;2)=2=minf;2g
 
Z 1


   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2| {z }
q(1;2)=
=minf;2g
gd1:
The derivative of Vd(
; ; ) with respect to  is always positive:
@Vd
@
(; ; ) =
1
2
(1  )2 (1 + 2   )  0:
Therefore, having  = 1 is optimal and dominant strategy grand-mechanisms with only
two thresholds su¢ ce to compute an optimal mechanism. Abusing slightly notations,
denoting then by Vd(
; ) the principals expected payo¤with a mechanism of the form
(4) and using the symmetry along the diagonal, we have:42
Vd(
; ) =  
Z 
0
Z 1
0

   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1 
Z 

Z 1
0

1   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1
 
Z 1

Z 
0

   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1  
Z 1

Z 1


2   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1: (A5)
Optimizing then (A5) with respect to  and  yields the results in the text.
42Note that in the expression for Vd(
; ) we use only the part of dominant strategy mechanism
which is below the line 2 = 1: The part which is above this line is the same by symmetry. This allows
us to get rid of the factor 12 :
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 Proof of Lemma 2: The proof is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 2, we know the structure of the strong collusion-
proof continuous mechanisms. Denote by Vsc(
; ) the principals expected payo¤ with
a strong collusion-proof mechanism of the form (12), we have:
Vsc(
; ) =  1
2
 Z 
0
(      )2 g()d + 2
Z 

g()d +
Z 1

(      )2 g()d
!
:
(A6)
Di¤erentiating with respect to  yields:
@Vsc
@
(; ) =  
Z 1

(      ) g()d > 0:
Therefore, it is optimal to always set sc = 1. Optimizing with respect to 
 yields then
the necessary and su¢ cient rst-order condition (13). Integrating by parts, this equation
can be rewritten as: R sc()
0
G(x)dx
G (sc())
= : (A7)
It can be easily checked that
R y
0 G(x)dx
G(y)
is increasing in y so that this equation has a unique
solution as long as   1
2
.
Two cases must be distinguished depending on whether sc() lies on the increasing
part of g() or not. For   1
6
, the solution is sc = 3. For   16 , the threshold sc()
solves (14). 43 Note that, for   1
2
, we obtain the corner solution sc() = 1.
 Proof of Lemma 3: The proof is again a straightforward application of Lemma 4.
The only thing to check is that a weak collusion-proof mechanism dened by (25) is
such that the participation constraint (7) binds indeed always at i = 0. Note that the
symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game induced by q(1; 2) = maxf; 1 +
2   1g is such that:
^

(i) 2 argmax
^ i
E i

 1
2

max
n
; ^i + ^

( i)  1
o
  i
2
:
We conjecture that such an equilibrium is obtained when ^

(i) = 
 for all i. Given
that agent  i plays this strategy, we have indeed 1
2

max
n
; ^i + 
   1
o
  i
2
=
1
2
(   i)2 and thus taking ^(i) = ^ is in the best-response correspondence. Then,
we have:
vd(i) =  1
2
(   i)2 :
43Equation (14) has three parametric roots: ^1 () ; ^2 () ; ^3 () : The one that is selected is such that
^i
 
1
6

= 12 : Then set 

sc () = ^i () :
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Finally, using (17) for a weak collusion-proof mechanism, we obtain:
_Ui(i) = E i (maxf; i +  i   1g)  i; for i = 1; 2; 8i 2 : (A8)
Hence, _Ui(i)  _vd(i) =    i with this inequality being an equality in a right neigh-
borhood of i = 0. The participation constraint (7) binds at i = 0 but also on a right
interval of i = 0 so that (21) holds for the truthful manipulation 
(1; 2) = (1; 2).
 Proof of Proposition 3: Denoting by Vwc(; ) the principals expected payo¤with
a weak collusion-proof mechanism of the form (25), we have:
Vwc(
; ) =  1
2
Z +1
2
0
(      )2 g()d
 1
2
Z +1
2
+1
2
(   1  )2g()d   1
2
Z 1
+1
2
(      )2 g()d: (A9)
The derivative of Vwc(
; ) with respect to  is zero at  = 1 since:
@Vwc
@
(; ) =  
Z 1
+1
2
(      ) g()d:
Therefore, setting  = 1 is optimal.
Optimizing then (A9) with respect to  yields (26) for an interior solution. Integrating
by parts, this equation can be rewritten as:R wc()+1
2
0
G(x)dx
G

wc()+1
2
 =  + 1  wc()
2
: (A10)
From this equation, one can derive that for  = 1
2
, we have wc
 
1
2

= 1 and that there is
full pooling for  > 1
2
:
On the other hand, for  = 0; the fact that y+
R y
0 G(x)dx
G(y)
is increasing in y implies that
necessarily wc(0) > 0, i.e., even when there is a priori no conict with the agents, there
is always some pooling in the optimal policy.
For   1
2
, we have: R sc()
0
G(x)dx
G (sc)
<  +
1  sc()
2
:
Comparing with (A10), and using again the fact that y+
R y
0 G(x)dx
G(y)
is increasing in y yields
wc()+1
2
> sc().
Note that the contract q () = max f; 2   1g is always dominated by the contractbq () = max f; g from the principals point of view. Therefore, a strong coalition merger
is always better than a weak one from the principals point of view.
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Other Weak Collusion-Proof Mechanisms: Let us now consider grand-mechanisms
such that the participation constraint (7) binds at  = 1. We can then write the interest
groupsrents as:
Ui(i) = v
d(1) 
Z 1
i
E i(q((x;  i))  x)dx;
and the participation constraint hold at all i when
vd(1)  vd(i) 
Z 1
i
(q((x;  i))  x)dx (A11)
Integrating by parts in the maximand of (TPwc) yields now an objective for the third-party
which is an expectation of terms of the form:
q()  1 + 2
2
2
+
2X
i=1
i(q()  i): (A12)
As before, there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to mechanisms such that
the (point-wise) optimal manipulation of reports made by the third-party is truthful. This
leads to express the following weak coalition incentive compatibility constraints:
(1; 2) = arg min
(^1;^2)
(q(^1; ^2)  )2 +
2X
i=1
i(q(^1; ^2)  i): (A13)
From (A13), we can again easily prove that q() depends only on the average ideal points
. Moreover, q() is monotonically increasing and thus almost everywhere di¤erentiable
in . At any point of di¤erentiability, the weak coalition incentive constraints can now be
written as:
_q()q() = 0; 8 2 : (A14)
Hence, we get:
Lemma 5 : Any weak collusion-proof and continuous mechanism q() such that the par-
ticipation constraint (7) binds at  = 1 is everywhere constant.
Clearly, such mechanisms are thus dominated by a weak collusion-proof mechanism sat-
isfying (25) from the principals viewpoint. Moreover,(A11) holds trivially everywhere.
There is no point considering such fully pooling mechanisms to compute the optimal
response to the threat of a weak collusion.44
 Proof of Proposition 4: We will begin this proof by showing some formal results
in the neighborhoods of  = 0 and of  = 1
2
. Then, we will move to some simulations
conrming our insights obtained with those local analysis.
44More generally, one may ask whether other collusion-proof mechanisms such that the the participation
constraint (7) binds on an set in the interior of  would help the principal. Although, we have not derived
those optimal collusion-proof mechanisms, we conjecture that they are sub-optimal.
35
Let us rst denote by Vi() (respectively Ui(), TPi()) for i = d; sc, the principals
(respectively an interest groups and third-partys) expected payo¤ under each organiza-
tional form of lobbying.
Welfare comparison for the principal: In the optimal grand-mechanism with a strong
coalition the principal obtains
Vsc() =  1
2
Z sc()
0
Z sc()
0

sc() 
1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1
 
Z 1
sc()
 Z 2sc() 1
0

sc() 
1 + 2
2
  
2
d2
!
d1  
Z 1
sc()
Z 1
2sc() 1
2d2

d1
for   1
6
; and
Vsc() =  1
2
Z 6
0
Z 6 1
0

3   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1 1
2
Z 6
0
Z 1
6 1
2d2

d1 1
2
Z 1
6
Z 1
0
2d2

d1
for  < 1
6
:
The optimal dominant strategy mechanism leads to the payo¤ Vd() to the principal
given by:
Vd() =  
Z 2
0
Z 1
0

2   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1  
Z 1
2
Z 1
0

1   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1
if  < 1
4
; and
Vd() =  
Z 2
0
Z 1
0

2   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1  
Z 2+ 1
2
2
Z 1
0

1   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1
 
Z 1
2+ 1
2
Z 2+ 1
2
0

2 +
1
2
  1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1 
Z 1
2+ 1
2
Z 1
2+ 1
2

2   1 + 2
2
  
2
d2d1;
if 1
4
   1
2
:
Local analysis:
Case  = 0: The strong coalition is aligned with the legislature and there is no cost
of private information in this case (because of no bias) whereas there is such a cost for
competition, we have: Vsc(0) = 0 > Vd(0): For the interest groups:
2Usc(0) + TPsc(0) =  
 Z 1
0
Z 1
0

1 + 2
2
  1
2
d2d1
!
=   1
24
:
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Under competition, the total expected payo¤ of the interest groups is:
2Ud(0) =  
Z (0)
0
Z (0)
1
(2   1)2 d2d1  
Z 1
(0)
Z 1
0
((0)  1)2 d2d1
 
Z 1
(0)
Z 1
(0)
(2   1)2 d2d1  
Z (0)
0
Z 1
(0)
((0)  1)2 d2d1 =   1
16
;
where (0) = 1
2
:
Therefore, 2Ud(0) < 2Usc(0) + TPsc(0) and the strong coalition is the optimal organi-
zation from a private viewpoint.
Case   1
2
: Let us denote  = 1
2
   for  small enough and non-negative. Under
competition, there is only one cut-o¤ d() = 1   2. With a strong coalition, Taylor
expansions in (14) yield: sc() = 1  :
With a strong coalition, the principals expected payo¤ can be approximated as:
Vsc

1
2
  

=  1
2
Z 1 2
0
Z 1
0

1
2
  1 + 2
2
2
d2d1
 1
2
Z 1
1 2
d1
 Z 2 2 1
0

1
2
  1 + 2
2
2
d2 +
Z 1
2 2 1

1
2
  
2
d2
!
=   1
48
+ o(2):
Under competition, the principals expected payo¤ can be approximated as:
Vd

1
2
  

=  
Z 1 2
0
Z 1
0

1
2
    1 + 2
2
2
d2d1
 
Z 1
1 2
Z 1
0

1   1
2
+   1 + 2
2
2
d2d1 =   1
48
(1  24) + o(2):
Hence, for  small enough, we have: Vsc
 
1
2
   < Vd  12    :
With a strong coalition, the sum of the expected payo¤ of the interest groups and the
third-party can be approximated as:
2Usc

1
2
  

+ TPsc

1
2
  

=  
Z 1 
0
Z 1 
0
(1    1)2 d2d1
 
Z 1
1 
Z 2 2 1
0
(1    1)2 d2d1  
Z 1
1 
Z 2 2 2
0
(1    1)2 d1d2
 
Z 1
1 2
Z 1
2 2 1
1
4
(2   1)2 d2d1 =  1
3
(1  3) +O(2):
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Under competition and using again symmetry, the expected payo¤ of an interest group
can be approximated as:
2Ud

1
2
  

=  
Z 1 2
0
Z 1 2
0
(1  2  1)2 d2d1  
Z 1
1 2
Z 2 2 2
0
(2   1)2 d1d2
=  1
3
(1  6) +O(2):
Hence, for  small enough, we have: 2Usc
 
1
2
  + TPsc  12    < 2Ud  12    :
Global analysis: To compare the utilities of the principal under competition Vd and
strong coalition Vsc it is convenient to make the following one-to-one change of variables:
 (sc) =
(
sc
3
if 0   < 1
6
1
6
4(sc)
3 12(sc)2+6sc 1
2(sc)
2 4sc+1
if 1
6
   1
2
;
(A15)
where the unique cut-o¤ for a strong coalition sc() is determined by (14) if   16 , and
sc() = 3 if  <
1
6
:
Since this change is monotonically increasing we may equivalently compare the payo¤s
in terms of sc: Let us denote again (with a slight abuse of notations) by Vi (

sc) (respec-
tively Ui (

sc) and TPi (

sc)) for i = d; sc; wc; the principals (respectively an interest
groups and third partys) expected payo¤ under each organizational form of lobbying.
To compare the payo¤s of the principal under competition and strong coalition we
replace the bias  by the threshold sc using (A15).
45 The utility of the principal under
competition Vd(

sc) is depicted on Figure 2 in solid line. For strong coalition the principals
payo¤ Vsc(

sc) is in dotted line.
45For dominant strategy mechanism we split the interval  2 0; 12 into three intervals:  2 0; 16 ;  2
1
6 ;
1
4

; and  2  14 ; 12 :
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Figure 2: Welfare comparison for the legislature.
Comparing these payo¤s we conclude that Vd() > Vsc() for  > 
  0:11 and for
 < , Vd() < Vsc(). Summarize: for  < 
  0:11 the strong coalition is the optimal
organization from a social viewpoint. For  > , the situation is reversed.
Welfare comparison for groups: Consider rst the case 1
4
   1
2
:With a strong coalition,
the sum of expected payo¤ of the interest groups and the third-party is:
2Usc ()+TPsc () =  
Z sc()
0
Z sc()
0
(sc()  1)2 d2d1 
Z 1
sc()
Z 2sc() 1
0
(sc()  1)2 d2d1
 
Z 1
sc()
Z 2sc() 2
0
(sc()  1)2 d1d2  
Z 1
2sc() 1
Z 1
2sc() 1
1
4
(2   1)2 d2d1 =
=
1
3
sc()
 
sc()
3   4sc()2 + 3sc()  1

:
Under competition and using again the symmetry, the expected payo¤ of the interest
groups is:
2Ud () =  
Z 2
0
Z 2
0
(2   1)2 d2d1  
Z 1
2
Z 2
0
(2   1)2 d1d2
=  44   1
12
: (A16)
We make the same change of variables as for principals from (A15). This leads to the
expression of 2Ud () in terms of 

sc :
2Ud (

sc) =  
1
12
24 1
27
 
4 (sc)
3   12 (sc)2 + 6sc   1
2 (sc)
2   4sc + 1
!4
+ 1
35 :
39
For 1
6
   1
4
; the expected payo¤of the interest groups and the third-party under strong
coalition is the same as above. Under competition, the expected payo¤ of the interest
groups is:
2Ud () =  
Z 2
0
Z 2
0
(2   1)2 d2d1  
Z 1
2
+2
2
Z 2
0
(2   1)2 d1d2 
 
Z 1
1
2
+2
Z 1
0

1
2
+ 2   1
2
d2d1  
Z 1
1
2
+2
Z 2
0

1
2
+ 2   1
2
d1d2:
We again express the di¤erence 2Ud ()  (2Usc () + TPsc ()) in terms of sc:
For 1
6
 , the optimal policy for strong coalition can be explicitly found. The domi-
nant strategy payo¤ is as in the case 2 above. Coalition payo¤ is
2Usc () + TPsc () =  
Z 6
0
Z 6 1
0
(3   1)2 d2d1 1
 
Z 6
0
 Z 1
6 1

1 + 2
2
  1
2
d2
!
d1   1
2
Z 1
6
 Z 1
0

1 + 2
2
  1
2
d2
!
d:
Finally we draw the respected payo¤s in terms of sc, for competition and for strong
coalition. As for the principals, the interest groupsexpected payo¤s under competition
is depicted on Figure 3 in solid line. For a strong coalition the payo¤ is in dotted line.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
theta*
U
Figure 3: Welfare comparison for groups.
For 1
4
   1
2
; we have: 2Usc () + TPsc () < 2Ud () : Competition is still preferable
for the groups for  >   0:22: However, for smaller biases:  <   0:22; the prefer-
ences for groups regarding the organization are reversed. Hence, the groups preferences
regarding the lobbying organization are similar to those of the principal.
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 Proof of Proposition 5: As it can be checked from Lemma 5 in the Appendix, weak
collusion-proof mechanisms such that the participation constraint (7) only binds at  = 1
entail full pooling and are thus clearly dominated by the mechanisms used with a strong
coalition.
For weak collusion-proof mechanisms such that the participation constraint (7) only
binds at  = 0 the proof is straightforward given that the virtual ideal point of a weak
coalition is always further apart from that of the principal than what arises with a strong
coalition.
To compare a weak coalition with competition we rst determine the cut-o¤ of the
weak collusion-proof mechanism given by the equation
Z wc()+1
2
0
(wc()     ) g()d = 0;
where g() is the density of the average of types. This equation in our case leads to
 2 (wc())3 + 6 (wc())2 + 3 (wc())2   6wc()  3   1 = 0:
Again, for convenience, we make the change of variables:
 (wc) =
6 (wc)
2   2 (wc)3   1
3
 
1 + 2wc   (wc)2
 : (A17)
This change of variables is a bijection from the interval [wc (0) ; 1] to

0; 1
2

: Note that
even for zero conict  the cut-o¤ is positive, wc (0) = 0:44 > 0:
We already have the principals payo¤s for competition, however, the cut-o¤ wc is
di¤erent:46
Vd(

wc) =
  2
3
4 (wc)  1192 if 0:44  wc < 0:73
2
3
4 (wc)  122 (wc) + 16 (wc)  148 if 0:73  wc  1:
(A18)
For weak coalition the payo¤ of the principal is:
Vwc(

wc) =  
1
2
Z wc+1
2
0
Z wc+1
2
0

wc  
1 + 2
2
  (wc)
2
d2d1
 
Z 1
wc+1
2
 Z 1+wc 1
0

wc  
1 + 2
2
  (wc)
2
d2
!
d1 
46wc
 
1
4

= 0:73:
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 
Z 1
wc+1
2
 Z 1
1+wc 1

1 + 2   1  1 + 2
2
  (wc)
2
d2
!
d1 =  1
3
(wc) 
1
2
2(wc)+
+
1
6
wc 
1
3
(wc)
3+
1
12
(wc)
4+
1
2
(wc)

wc+
1
2
(wc) (

wc)
2  1
16
  1
6
(wc) (

wc)
3 : (A19)
We plug  from (A17) to (A18) and (A19) and then draw the payo¤s in the relevant
interval 0:44  wc  1: The competition payo¤ (solid line) is everywhere bigger that the
payo¤ under a weak coalition (dotted line).
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For groups the total payo¤ under weak coalition is:
2Uwc (

wc) + TPwc (

wc) =  
Z wc+1
2
0
Z wc+1
2
0
(wc   1)2 d2d1
 
Z 1
wc+1
2
Z 1+wc 1
0
(wc   1)2 d2d1  
Z 1
wc+1
2
Z 1+wc 2
0
(wc   1)2 d1d2 
 
Z 1
wc
Z 1
1+wc 1
(1 + 2   1  1)2 d2d1 = 1
6
4wc  
2
3
3wc +
1
3
wc  
1
6
:
For competition if   1
4
:
2Ud () =  
Z 2
0
Z 2
0
(2   1)2 d2d1  
Z 1
2
Z 2
0
(2   1)2 d1d2 =  44   1
12
;
and if   1
4
:
2Ud () =  
Z 2
0
Z 2
0
(2   1)2 d2d1  
Z 1
2
+2
2
Z 2
0
(2   1)2 d1d2 
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 
Z 1
1
2
+2
Z 1
0

1
2
+ 2   1
2
d2d1  
Z 1
1
2
+2
Z 2
0

1
2
+ 2   1
2
d1d2 =
=   13
192
+
1
4
   5
2
2 + 43:
We again change the variable  for wc and compare the payo¤s of groups. Similarly to the
case of principals one can see that for groups competition overweights a weak coalition.
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